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Abstract
Herings et al. (2008) proposed a solution concept called the average tree solution
for cycle-free graph games. We provide a characterization of the average tree solution
for cycle-free graph games. The characteration underlines an important di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11 Introduction
A cooperative game is dened by a set of agents and a worth function on coalitions of agents.
Often agents have positional structure, e.g., computers on Internet, shops along a street. In
many settings, not every agent can communicate with every other agent. Such a setting can
be represented by a graph, where nodes represent the agents and a link between a pair of
agents represents that the agents are able to communicate.
A graph game is dened by a set of agents, a set of links among agents, and a worth
function on coalitions of connected agents, where a set of agents is connected if every agent in
that set can directly or indirectly (via other agents in the set) communicate with every other
agent. The study of graph games was pioneered by the seminal paper of Myerson (1977).
He dened a solution concept called the Myerson value for graph games, and characterized
it using two axioms: eciency and fairness. While eciency is the standard axiom of
total allocation being equal to the worth of the grand coalition 1, fairness is the following
requirement. If a particular link is broken in the graph, the loss in payo of the agents
which are endpoints of the link must be the same. Further, Myerson (1977) showed that the
Myerson value is the Shapley value of a restricted cooperative game. Other characterizations
of Myerson value can be found in Myerson (1980); Borm et al. (1992).
A special subclass of graph games is the class of cycle-free graph games, i.e., graph games
in which the underlying graph has no cycles. A line graph, where agents are nodes on a
straight line and every agent has a link with his neighbor(s) is a cycle-free graph. So is a
star graph, where there is a center agent and every other agent is only linked to the center
agent. Notice that a cycle-free graph is asymmetric by denition. For example, an agent
i can communicate with j and j in turn can communicate with k but k cannot directly
communicate with i because of cycle-freeness. Hence, j has more communication power
than i and k.
Herings et al. (2008) use such specic properties of cycle-free graph games to dene a new
solution concept, called the average tree solution, for such games. The average tree solution
considers a set of trees, each tree corresponding to some unique agent as the root node. For
each tree, it denes a marginal contribution vector over agents. The average tree solution
is the average of these marginal contribution vectors. Herings et al. (2008) characterize the
average tree solution using eciency and component fairness. Note that if a link is broken
in a (connected) cycle-free graph, it creates two components. Component fairness requires
that the average loss in payo of agents in both the components must be the same.
Besides this axiomatic interpretation, the average tree solution is easy to compute, be-
cause the number of marginal vectors involved is equal to the number of agents, and be-
1We assume in the paper that the grand coalition is connected. If one drops this assumption, eciency
needs to be replaced by component eciency, which requires that the allocation be ecient in every compo-
nent (a set of maximally connected nodes) of the graph.
2longs to the core of the game if the game is superadditive. The latter result is proved in
Herings et al. (2008), and follows from earlier results in Demange (1994, 2004); Kaneko and Wooders
(1982); Le Breton et al. (1992).
Since the Myerson value is the Shapley value of a restricted game, there is a close con-
nection between the Myerson value and the Shapley value. This begs the natural question:
How does the average tree solution dier from or relate to the Shapley value? To answer
this question, we give a characterization of the average tree solution for cycle-free games
using ve axioms: (a) eciency, (b) dummy, (c), linearity, (d) strong symmetry, (e) inde-
pendence in unanimity games. Eciency, dummy, and linearity are simple generalizations
of the corresponding axioms used by Shapley (1953) for the characterization of the Shapley
value. Strong symmetry requires that if all coalitions except the grand coalition have worth
zero, then every agent should get the same payo. Independence in unanimity game requires
that if we consider two unanimity games, one corresponding to coalition T and the other
corresponding to coalition T [ fjg, then the payo of all agents i 2 T such that there is
no link between i and j must be the same in both games. The independence in unanimity
game axiom has the following interpretation. Consider a cycle-free unanimity graph game
corresponding to coalition T. An agent i 2 T can be thought to represent an agent j = 2 T
in this unanimity game if the unique path from i to j does not contain any other agents
from T. 2 Of course i 2 T also represents himself. Independence in unanimity game axiom
implies then that if the number of agents an agent represents is the same in two unanimity
games, then his payos are the same also. Herings et al. (2008) show that in a unanimity
game corresponding to coalition T, the payo of every agent in T is the fraction of the total
number of agents the agent represents. Hence, the average tree solution clearly satises
this axiom. We show that this axiom along with eciency, dummy, strong symmetry, and
linearity gives rise to a unique allocation, namely the average tree solution. For a unanimity
game corresponding to coalition T, the Myerson value treats all agents in T symmetrically,
whereas the average tree solution treats them in proportion to the number of agents they
represent. Using our characterization, we nd this to be the main dierence between the
average tree solution and the Myerson value.
2 The Model
Let N = f1;:::;ng be a set of agents. An agent may be able to communicate directly with a
limited set of agents. This situation is represented by an undirected graph, where the set of
nodes is N, one for every agent, and the set of edges is L  ffi;jg : i 6= j;i;j 2 Ng. Thus,
G = (N;L) is an undirected graph. Two agents i and j in N can communicate if fi;jg 2 L.
2Because we focus on cycle-free graphs, there cannot be more than one path between two nodes in such
graphs.
3A distinct sequence of nodes (i1;:::;ik) is called a path in a graph (N;L) if k  2 and
fi1;i2g, fi2;i3g, :::;fik 1;ikg 2 L. If (i1;:::;ik) is a path, then we call it a path between i1
and ik using edges fi1;i2g,:::,fik 1;ikg. A sequence of nodes (i1;:::;ik;i1) is called a cycle
in (N;L) if k  3, (i1;:::;ik) is a path and fik;i1g 2 L. We say a graph G = (N;L) is
cycle-free if G contains no cycles. Our focus in this paper is on graphs which are cycle-free.
Note that the following two important class of graphs are cycle-free.
 Line graphs: In this graph L = ff1;2g;f2;3g;:::;fn   1;ngg. So, agents are in a
line and every agent can only communicate with his neighbor(s). Cities along a river is
an example of such a setting, where a city may only communicate with its neighboring
cities.
 Star graphs: In this graph, there is a center agent, say agent 1. Every other agent
is only connected to the center agent, i.e., L = ff1;2g;f1;3g;f1;4g;:::;f1;ngg. For
example, consider a marketplace on the Internet where a seller is selling some goods
to a set of buyers who are able to communicate to the seller (marketplace) but do not
know the identities of other buyers to communicate.
We x a graph G = (N;L). We say a set of agents S  N is connected if for every
i;j 2 S there exists a path (i;i1;:::;ik;j) between i and j such that i1;:::;ik 2 S. We
assume that a coalition S can be formed only if S is connected. Hence, the set of coalitions
is the following set:
C(N;L) = fS  N : S is connectedg:
We assume that N 2 C(N;L), i.e., the grand coalition can always be formed. The worth of
a coalition is dened in the usual manner except that we only restrict attention to coalitions
in C(N;L). Let v : C(N;L) ! R be the worth function. The triple (N;L;v) denes a graph
game. In particular, it denes a cycle-free graph game since we assume G = (N;L) to be a
cycle-free graph.
For any T  N, dene LT to be the set of edges from L which uses nodes in T only. Note
that (T;LT) also denes a graph, which is a subgraph of (N;L). Also, dene C(T;LT) =
fS  T : S is connectedg. A set of agents S  T is maximally connected or a component in
the graph (T;LT) if S is connected and there exists no agent i 2 T n S such that S [ fig is
connected. Let Cm(T;LT) denote the set of components in the graph (T;LT). Note that if
S1;S2 2 Cm(T;LT) are dierent components, then S1 \ S2 = ;. Hence, Cm(T;LT) gives a
partitioning of the set of nodes in T.
3 The Axioms
Let G be the set of all cycle-free graph games. An allocation is a mapping  : G ! Rn. For a
game (N;L;v) 2 G , i(N;L;v) denotes the payo of agent i 2 N. We consider the following
4axioms for any allocation function. The rst three axioms are standard or generalizations of
standard axioms in the cooperative game literature. The rst axiom is eciency.




Eciency says that the worth of the grand coalition is always allocated. The following
notion of marginal contribution is standard in graph games (Myerson, 1977). Consider a
coalition S 2 C(N;L) with i 2 S. If we remove agent i from S, then components of S n fig




i (S) = v(S)  
X
K2Cm(Snfig;LSnfig)
v(K) 8 S 2 C(N;L); 8 i 2 S:
The next axiom generalizes the dummy axiom of cooperative games.
Definition 2 An allocation  satises dummy if for any game (N;L;v) 2 G it holds for
all i 2 N that i(N;L;v) = 0 whenever 
N;L;v
i (S) = 0 for all S 2 C(N;L) and S 3 i.
The dummy axiom says that if an agent never contributes in forming a coalition, then
his payo should be zero. The next axiom is the linearity axiom.
Definition 3 An allocation  satises linearity if for any two games (N;L;v) and (N;L;w)
in G and any a;b 2 R,
i(N;L;av + bw) = ai(N;L;v) + bi(N;L;w) 8 i 2 N;
where av + bw is dened as (av + bw)(S) = av(S) + bw(S) for all S 2 C(N;L).
In the cooperative game literature, a standard axiom is the symmetry axiom. Because of
cycle-free graphs, agents are inherently asymmetric in these games. For example, in the star
graph games, the center and other agents are not symmetric since the center is connected
directly to every other agent. So, we replace the standard symmetry axiom in Shapley (1953)
by some basic axioms which are suitable for cycle-free graph games.
Definition 4 An allocation  satises strong symmetry if for any game (N;L;v) 2 G
with v(S) = 0 for all S 2 C(N;L) and S 6= N, we have i(N;L;v) = j(N;L;v) for all
i;j 2 N.
5The strong symmetry axiom says that if all coalitions, except possibly the grand coalition,
have worth equal to zero, then every agent should get the same payo. Together with
eciency this implies that when v(S) = 0 for all S 2 C(N;L) and S 6= N, then each player
gets a payo of
v(N)
n . The next axiom is on the class of unanimity games. For a coalition




1 if S  T
0 otherwise.
The triple (N;L;uT) denes a unanimity game corresponding to coalition T 2 C(N;L). We
now introduce an axiom for unanimity games which is the following requirement. Suppose
we have a unanimity game corresponding to coalition T 2 C(N;L) with T 6= N. Consider
j = 2 T such that T [ fjg 2 C(N;L). Also, consider i 2 T such that fi;jg = 2 L. We require
that the payo for i should be the same in both games (N;L;uT) and (N;L;uT[fjg).
Definition 5 An allocation  satises independence in unanimity games if for any
game (N;L;v) 2 G it holds for all T;T [ fjg 2 C(N;L) with j = 2 T and for all i 2 T with
fi;jg = 2 L that
i(N;L;uT) = i(N;L;uT[fjg):
Independence in unanimity games says that if agent j joins coalition T in the unanimity
game with respect to T, each agent i 2 T not linked to j should get the same payo. Since
the graph is cycle-free, j is linked to just one player in T. Only for this player in T the payo
might change.
We conclude this section with two axioms on fairness. The rst one, called fairness is due
to Myerson (1977). The second one, called component fairness is due to Herings et al. (2008).
To describe the axioms, we need some notation. Suppose in the cycle-free graph (N;L;v),
we delete a link fi;jg 2 L. Then, the graph is partitioned into two cycle-free graphs, one
containing i and the other containing j. We denote these graph games as (Ni;Li;vi) and
(Nj;Lj;vj), respectively.
Definition 6 An allocation  satises fairness if for any cycle-free game (N;L;v) 2 G it








Fairness requires that if a link in L is deleted, then the loss by the agents involved in that
link is the same. Herings et al. (2008) introduced component fairness.
6Definition 7 An allocation  satises component fairness if for any cycle-free game























Component fairness requires that by deleting a link fi;jg 2 L the average loss of both
coalitions Ni and Nj should be the same.
4 The Average Tree Solution and the Myerson Value
In this section, we describe the average tree solution and the Myerson value. First, we
describe the average tree solution proposed by Herings et al. (2008) for cycle-free graph
games. It requires construction of directed graphs from the given cycle-free graph. A directed
graph is a pair (N;D), where N is the set of nodes and D is the set of directed edges (ordered
pairs of nodes), i.e., D  f(i;j) : i 2 N;j 2 Ng. If directed edge (i;j) 2 D, then i is a
predecessor of j and j is a successor of i. Like in the undirected graph case, we can dene the
notion of path and cycle, the only modication being we now have to respect the direction
of edges. A node j is a subordinate of node i 6= j in graph (N;D) if there is a (directed)
path from i to j in (N;D). Let SD(i) denote the set of subordinates of i in the directed
graph (N;D). Let S
+
D(i) = SD(i)[fig. For any K  N, the directed graph (K;DK), where
DK = f(i;j) 2 D : i;j 2 Kg, is called the directed subgraph of (N;L) on K. A directed
graph is a tree if there is a node i, called the root node with no predecessors and there is a
unique path from i to every other node j 6= i.
For a cycle-free graph (N;L), every node i 2 N induces a tree in the following manner.
For any j 6= i and j 2 N, take the unique path between i and j in (N;L), and then change
every edge in that path to a directed edge such that the rst node in any ordered pair is the
node that comes rst in the path from i to j. Denote such a tree with i being the root node
as T(i). Dene LT(i)(j) = fk 2 N : (j;k) 2 T(i)g as the set of successors of j in tree T(i).
Note that LT(i)(j)  ST(i)(j). Figure 1 shows an undirected line graph with four nodes, and
the four directed trees, one corresponding to each agent, of this graph. We now associate a
payo to every player in every tree on N. Let (N;L;v) be a cooperative game. Associate
player j 2 N a payo ti















So, in tree T(i), we assign player j a payo which equals the worth of the coalition consisting
of j and his subordinates minus the sum of the worth of the coalitions consisting of each of
























Figure 1: A line graph and its directed trees
Note that there are exactly n such trees - one tree corresponding to every agent as root node.
The average tree solution is the average of such payos over all trees.
Definition 8 To any cycle-free graph game (N;L;v) 2 G, the average tree solution







Herings et al. (2008) showed that for the class of cycle-free graph games the average tree
solution is the unique allocation satisfying eciency and component fairness in cycle-free
graph games.
The Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) is dened as follows. For a graph game 3 (N;L;v),
the corresponding restricted cooperative game is the cooperative game (N;vL), where the





v(T) 8 S  N:
The Myerson value, denoted as MV (N;L;v), is then the Shapley value of the game (N;vL),
i.e.,
MVj(N;L;v) = Shj(N;v
L) 8 j 2 N:
The Myerson value is the unique allocation satisfying eciency and fairness.
3The Myerson value is dened for any graph game, even for graphs which has a cycle.
85 Characterization
We give an alternate characterization of the average tree solution. The objective of the
characterization is to use axioms similar to the axioms used in Shapley (1953). In a cycle-free
graph agents are inherently asymmetric - for example, in a game with three agents, there
is only one type of cycle-free graph, namely the line graph where the central agent looks
somewhat more powerful than the other two agents. Hence, we cannot use the symmetry
axiom in Shapley (1953). The symmetry axiom will be replaced by two axioms, strong
symmetry and independence in unanimity games. The other axioms are the same or direct
generalizations of axioms used in Shapley (1953).
We rst motivate the characterization for unanimity games. For this, we use a result of
Herings et al. (2008). Consider any S 2 C(N;L). For j 2 S we say agent j represents agent
k = 2 S for coalition S if j is connected to k and in the unique path connecting j to k, every
agent except agent j is outside S. Let pL
S(j) be the number of agents that j represents for
coalition S.
Herings et al. (2008) showed that for any cycle-free unanimity graph game (N;L;uT),





n 8 j 2 T
0 otherwise.
The result has the following interpretation. Consider an unanimity game (N;L;uT).
The number 1 + pL
T(j) is the total number of agents that agent j represents for coalition T









ects the representation power of agent j for coalition T. The average tree solution shares
the payo of a unanimity game in terms of representation power of the agents. Hence, if in
a cycle-free graph i represents the same number of agents for coalition T as agent j does for
coalition S, then agent i gets the same payo in game (N;L;uT) as agent j gets in game
(N;L;uS). Agents with the same representation power get the same in the corresponding
unanimity games.
On the other hand, the Myerson value for a cycle-free unanimity graph game (N;L;uT),




jTj 8 j 2 T
0 otherwise.
Thus, the Myerson value treats agents within T symmetrically in the cycle-free unanimity
graph game (N;L;uT), whereas the average tree solution treats them on the basis of how
many agents each of them represents. Our characterization of the average tree solution
for cycle-free graph games underlines this important dierence between the two solution
concepts.
9Theorem 1 On the class of cycle-free graph games, the average tree solution is the unique
solution satisfying eciency, dummy, strong symmetry, independence in unanimity games,
and linearity.
Proof: We do the proof in three steps.
Step 1: First, we show that the average tree solution satises all the axioms mentioned in
the statement of the theorem. By denition, it satises eciency. Since the average tree
solution is a linear function of the marginals, it also satises the dummy axiom and linearity.
For strong symmetry, note that if v(S) = 0 for all S 2 C(N;L) and S 6= N, then for
every agent j 2 N the only tree that matters in the average tree solution computation is the
tree in which j is the root node. The marginal contribution of j corresponding to this tree is
v(N), which is independent of j. Hence, the average tree solution satises strong symmetry.
For independence in unanimity games, consider two unanimity games (N;L;uT) and
(N;L;uT[fjg) such that i 2 T, j = 2 T, and fi;jg = 2 L. Since fi;jg = 2 L and T [ fjg is
connected, there exists a path from (i;i1;:::;ip;j) with i1;:::;ip 2 T and p  1. Since the
graph is cycle-free, this is the unique path between i and j. Hence, there exists no path
(i;j1;:::;jq;j) such that j1;:::;jq = 2 T. So, i does not represent j for coalition T. Consider
any k = 2 T but connected to i such that the unique path from i to k does not contain an agent
from T. Since i does not represent j, no such path can contain j. Hence, pL
T(i) = pL
T[fjg(i).
This implies that ATi(N;L;uT) = ATi(N;L;uT[fjg).
Step 2: Second, we show that the average tree solution is the unique solution satisfying
eciency, dummy, strong symmetry, and independence in unanimity games for any cycle-free
unanimity graph game. Let  be an allocation which satises all these axioms. Consider the




8 k 2 N:
Since pL




8 k 2 N:
Therefore,  is the average tree solution for (N;L;uN). Let T be a connected set of agents
and let jTj = t. We use induction on t. We have already shown that  is the average tree
solution for t = n. Let t < n. Suppose  is the average tree solution for any uananimity
game (N;L;uS) with jSj > t. We show that  is the average tree solution for (N;L;uT).
Since N is connected and t < n, there exists j = 2 T such that T [ fjg is connected. Let
S = T [ fjg. By our induction hypothesis,




8 k 2 N: (3)
10Consider any k = 2 T. By denition, for every S 2 C(N;L) and S 3 k, we have 
N;L;uT
k (S) =
0. Hence, by dummy
k(N;L;uT) = 0 = ATk(N;L;uT): (4)
Let i be the unique agent in T such that fi;jg 2 L. Consider k 2 T nfig. By independence
in unanimity games and equation (3),





We show that pL
S(k) = pL
T(k). Denote the set of agents who k represents for S as P L
S (k).
Clearly, P L
S (k)  P L
T (k). Assume for contradiction, there exists k0 2 P L
T (k)nP L
S (k). Since the
graph is cycle-free, there exists a unique path (k;k1;k2;:::;kq;k0) such that k1;:::;kq = 2 T.
Since k0 = 2 P L
S (k), j 2 fk1;:::;kqg. This implies that there is a path (k;k1;:::;kr;j) from k
to j such that k1;:::;kr = 2 T. Clearly, r  1, since fk;jg = 2 L. Since T [ fjg is connected,
there also exists another path (k;i1;:::;ip;j) from k to j such that i1;:::;ip 2 T. Since the
graph is cycle-free, two distinct paths from k to j is not possible, yielding a contradiction.










By equations (6) and (4), for every k 6= i, we have
k(N;L;uT) = ATk(N;L;uT):
By eciency, i(N;L;uT) = ATi(N;L;uT).
Step 3: Finally, we show that the average tree solution is the unique solution satisfy-
ing eciency, dummy, strong symmetry, independence in unanimity games, and linearity.
Herings et al. (2008) show that every cycle-free game can be written as a linear function of
cycle-free unanimity graph games, and the average tree solution for a cycle-free unanimity
graph game (N;L;uT) is given by
1+pL
T(j)
n if j 2 T and zero otherwise. In Step 2, we showed
that the unique solution satisfying eciency, dummy, strong symmetry, and independence in
cycle-free unanimity graph games is the average tree solution. By linearity, the result then
follows. 
We now show that the axioms used in Theorem 1 are independent. The Myerson value
satises eciency, dummy, strong symmetry, and linearity, but fails independence in una-
nimity games. This follows from the facts that (a) the Myerson value is the Shapley value of
the cooperative game (N;vL) and (b) for any unanimity game (N;L;uT), the Myerson value
assigns every agent i 2 T a payo equal to 1
jTj whereas agents outside T get zero payo.
11Equal sharing, where every agent gets
v(N)
n , satises eciency, strong symmetry, linearity,
and independence in unanimity games, but fails dummy. The zero allocation, where every
agent gets zero payo, satises strong symmetry, linearity, dummy, and independence in
unanimity games, but fails eciency.
Consider the allocation d where for some i 2 T we consider the tree T(i) with i as the
root node, and d
j(N;L;v) = ti
j(N;L;v) for all j 2 N. Clearly, d satises eciency, dummy,
and linearity. For a cycle-free unanimity graph game (N;L;uS) call agent k 2 S a dictator
in S if k is the rst agent in any path in T(i) from root node i to any agent in S. It is clear
that for dictator agent k in S, d
k(N;L;uS) = 1 and d
j(N;L;uS) = 0 if j 6= k. Now, consider
two cycle-free unanimity graph games (N;L;uS) and (N;L;uS[fjg). Let k 2 S such that
fk;jg = 2 L. There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: Agent k is not a dictator in S. Clearly, he cannot be a dictator agent in S [ fjg
either. Hence, his allocation is zero in both games.
Case 2: Agent k is a dictator in S. Since fk;jg = 2 L, k will still come rst in any path from
root node to any node in S [ fjg. Hence, k will remain a dictator in S [ fjg. Hence, his
allocation is one in both games.
This shows that d satises independence in unanimity games. Now consider a game
(N;L;v) such that v(S) = 0 for all S 2 C(N;L) and S 6= N. In that case, d
i (N;L;v) =
ti
i(N;L;v) = v(N) and d
j(N;L;v) = 0 for all j 6= i. Hence, d fails strong symmetry. Thus,
allocation d satises eciency, dummy, linearity, and independence in unanimity games,
but fails strong symmetry.
Finally, consider the following allocation: for cycle-free unanimity graph games it is the
average tree solution and for every other cycle-free game it is the Myerson value. Clearly,
the allocation satises eciency, dummy, independence in unanimity games, and strong
symmetry, but fails linearity.
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